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Abstract

We examine if a floating net asset value (NAV) increases the transparency of risk for investors. Using closed‐
income fixed income funds we find little evidence that a floating NAV helps investors better understand the
value and risk of a fund when a fund's assets trade infrequently. This potentially informs the debate regarding
the adoption of a floating NAV in the money market industry. Our results suggest that it is unlikely that the
benefits of floating NAV will outweigh the costs.
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1. Introduction
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, Reserve Primary “broke the buck.”[ 1] This prompted some
institutional investors to quickly withdraw their moneys from prime money market funds (MMFs), due to fears
that they would also “break the buck,” exposing a weakness in the fundamental structure of the money market
industry.[ 2] The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) responded to this revelation in 2010 by modifying
rule 2a‐7 of the Investment Act of 1940, requiring MMFs to improve the liquidity and credit quality of their
portfolios.[ 3]
However, the changes enacted in 2010 did not address the $1 fixed net asset value (NAV) used by MMFs, which
many worry hides the value of the fund's underlying portfolio. This issue continued to be debated after the 2010
policy changes, and lead to additional modifications. On July 23, 2014, the SEC adopted the following changes to
the rules governing the MMF industry.[ 4]
The two primary changes in 2013 are:
1. Institutional nongovernment MMFs are required to sell and redeem shares based on the current
market‐based value of the securities in their underlying portfolios rounded to the fourth decimal place
(e.g., $1.0000), that is, transact at a “floating” NAV.[ 5]
2. The boards of directors of nongovernment MMFs may impose a liquidity fee if a fund's weekly liquidity
level falls below the required regulatory threshold, and may suspend redemptions temporarily, that is,
to “gate” funds, under the same circumstances.
The SEC hopes that the change to a floating NAV will increase the transparency of MMF risk.[ 6]
However, it is unclear whether investors view changes in NAV as informative, with respect to risk, when
reported NAV is based on estimated values of securities that trade infrequently, such as the securities held by
MMFs. MMFs in the United States have used the fixed $1 NAV since the inception of MMFs, so we cannot
empirically test the value of a floating NAV on MMFs. However, closed‐end fixed income funds also hold
securities that trade infrequently.[ 7] Therefore we explore whether a floating NAV is informative when
securities trade infrequently in the closed‐end fixed income fund industry, because as the Director of the
Division of Market Regulation of the SEC said, “For investors, as well as regulators, the difficulty lies in
establishing the prevailing market price for a bond.”[ 8]
We examine closed‐end fixed income funds because they invest in assets that trade infrequently, and report an
NAV based on the current (estimated) market price of the assets in their portfolio (floating NAV). Additionally,
since closed‐end funds do not transact with their investors directly, we are able to observe the market
determined price of the closed‐end fund's shares. Thus, closed‐end fixed income funds allow us to observe a
floating NAV based on estimated values of infrequently traded securities and a market determined share price,
which proxies for the fund's shadow price. If a floating NAV makes risk more transparent and provides investors
with information regarding the pricing of the fund, then we would expect that the direction of NAV changes are
mirrored by similar directional changes in the fund's price.
We find that daily NAV changes and price changes have the same sign approximately 85% of the time. While this
is consistent with the idea the investors find a floating NAV informative, the changes are based on closing prices
and end of day NAVs. This means that while the changes cover the same period, closing prices are recorded
before the end of day NAV is reported. Therefore, the results suggest that the market is aware of the same
information as the managers before observing the NAV change.
As NAV is reported after closing prices are recorded, investors are unable to act on any information contained in
the NAV change until the next day. Therefore, we examine the relation between the prior day's change in NAV

(closet‒1‐to‐closet) and the overnight change in price (closet‐to‐opent+1). We focus on those instances where the
concurrent NAV and price changes disagree, as this is where NAV changes are likely to be the most informative.
We find that the overnight price change moves opposite the prior days NAV change 48% of the time. This
suggests that NAV changes provide little information to fund investors.
While bonds in general trade infrequently, Barclay, Hendershott and Kotz ([ 4] ) provide evidence that longer
term bonds trade less frequently then shorter term bonds. The fact that trading frequency is related to bond
maturity leads us to explore if the informativeness of NAV changes is a function of the maturity of the closed‐
end fund's portfolio. We split funds into subsamples based on the duration (the available proxy for time to
maturity) of their underlying portfolio, to explore the possible impact of time to maturity on our results. We first
separate out those funds with durations under one year. This follows the traditional separation of money and
capital markets at one year. We split the remainder of our sample into terciles based on the duration of their
portfolios, leaving us with four duration subsamples. As in our full sample analysis we examine the frequency
that overnight price changes are in the same direction as the prior day's NAV changes, when the prior day's NAV
and price changes moved in opposite directions. We find results similar to our full sample results. The overnight
price change is directionally consistent with the prior day's NAV change between 50% and 53%, again suggesting
that a floating NAV offers investors little information. Moreover, the relatively consistent results suggest that
the duration of the fund's portfolio has little influence on the information provided by NAV changes.
Simply comparing the direction of changes in NAV and prices may be too coarse an approach to detect subtle
changes in investor inferences regarding the value of the fund's portfolio. Therefore, we explore the relation
between price and NAV changes on a fund‐by‐fund basis using interval regression. We find a positive and
significant relation between overnight price changes and NAV changes for 46% of funds, an insignificant relation
for 47% of funds, and a negative relation for 7% of funds. This also suggests that changes in NAV provide little
information to investors regarding fund pricing.
Last, we directly examine the ability of floating NAV to provide information about a fund's relative level of risk.
Using the broadest definition of risk, variance, we explore the ability of NAV variance to predict the fund's risk
the following month. We find that NAV variance provides little information regarding the subsequent risk of the
fund. In general, our results suggest that a floating NAV provides little incremental information to investors
regarding the price or risk associated with their investment in the fund; investors appear to be able to infer
expected changes in portfolio NAV themselves from other market information.

2. Closed‐end fixed income funds: Pricing and NAV
Both price and NAV reflect the value of a closed‐end fund's share. While this suggests that the two should be
equal, there are several reasons why the two may diverge: the illiquid nature of the portfolio securities, agency
costs, and tax liability. The illiquid nature of the portfolio securities potentially makes it difficult for the fund to
trade the security without moving the price. Agency costs refer to the potential that “management expenses
incurred in running the fund are too high and/or the potential for subpar managerial performance reduces asset
value” (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, [ 14] , p. 75). Tax liability implies that NAV does not account for the imbedded
capital gains liability that will be incurred if the fund sells assets, which have appreciated in value (Boudreaux,
[ 7] ; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, [ 14] ). We believe these issues would lead to a relatively stable difference
between a fund's reported NAV and its price, and should not play a major role in our investigations given our
focus on daily changes in NAV and price.
In addition to potential differences in NAVs and prices, we will mention three other issues from the literature.
The first is the general belief that the NAV represents the true value of the fund's portfolio (see Bodie, Kane and
Marcus, [ 6] , p. 108). This belief is predicated on the nature of open‐end equity funds, which tend to invest in

securities that trade frequently. The availability of recent transactions prices allows fund managers to use actual
market prices in their calculation of NAV. This combined with the fact that open‐end funds issue and redeem
fund shares at NAV justify the belief that NAV reflects the true value of an open‐end equity fund. However, in
this study we examine closed‐end fixed income funds, which tend to invest in securities that trade infrequently
forcing the use of estimated security values in their NAV calculations. Additionally, closed‐end funds do not issue
or redeem shares at NAV. Instead, investors trade fund shares with each other on a market at a market
determined price. Therefore, while NAV likely reflects an open‐end equity fund's true value, for closed‐end fixed
income funds it represents the manager's estimated value of the fund.
The second issue relates to several papers: Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec ([ 9] ), Greene and Hodges ([ 13] ), and
Zitzewitz ([ 18] ), which find exploitable trading opportunities at open‐end funds that fail to account for
nonsynchronous trading when calculating NAV. Again, as we study closed‐end funds we do not feel this is an
issue because closed‐end funds do not issue and redeem fund shares at their reported NAV.[ 9] Interestingly,
the profitable trading opportunities, in the open‐end funds, arise because the managers at these funds are
relying on “stale” prices, which suggest that NAVs may be less than fully informative, in the absence of recent
transaction prices.
The third issue relates to the use of estimated values in NAV calculations. Morgan Keegan & Company provides
an example of concerns associated with the use of estimated values. While a full description of the SEC actions
against Morgan Keegan is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that the SEC alleges that Morgan Keegan
violated their own stated valuation procedures. Specifically, they allege that the fair market value estimates of
the funds’ assets were made by low level employees who lacked the training and experience necessary to make
these determinations. Fund accountants relied on “price adjustments” provided by portfolio managers with little
or no supporting documentation. Last, the valuation committee failed to ensure that estimated asset prices
were updated periodically. While this is a single company, it does show the potential issues associated with
relying on a fund's own estimates of the value of the securities in its own portfolio.

3. Data
We use the Morningstar Direct database to compile a list of U.S. closed‐end fixed income funds (161), which
existed between January 2006 and December 2012. We collect the asset mix of each fund's investment portfolio
from Morningstar. Table 1 presents the average investment portfolio mix yearly to show any variation through
time.[ 10] As one would expect, the majority of each portfolio is invested in corporate bonds. Additionally, the
portfolio mix is relatively constant throughout our sample period.
Table 1 Sample descriptive statistics: Portfolio composition
This table presents the average percentages of fund assets invested in each asset class by year. Each column
represents a year in our sample. Column 1 lists the types of securities held. The numbers shown in columns 2–8
show the average percentage of portfolio invested.
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Corporate bonds
51.98
60.97
55.71
55.82
50.94
53.06
45.10
Bank loans
5.77
4.39
6.22
7.77
5.10
6.58
10.22
Preferred stock
9.79
8.14
9.45
9.30
8.54
8.60
8.13
Municipals
0.28
0.16
0.26
0.65
1.54
3.42
3.41
Cash
11.71
10.56
9.74
10.64
6.68
4.27
7.02
Non‐U.S. Govt.
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
7.71
9.02
6.91
Agency MBS
9.08
6.27
7.93
5.28
3.00
3.06
3.16
Non‐agency MBS
2.01
1.47
2.54
2.75
4.86
4.36
4.81
Other
9.38
8.03
8.16
7.77
11.63
7.64
11.24

1 MBS, Mortgage Backed Securities.
Morningstar only reports monthly prices and NAVs. As we examine whether floating NAV provides timely
information about risk, we require higher frequency data. Therefore, we collect daily opening and closing prices
and closing NAV data from Bloomberg. This is the highest frequency data available because funds only report
NAV at the end of each day.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on NAV, closing price and spread (NAV – price) of the closed‐end fixed
income fund sample. The sample contains 214,936 fund days with a mean spread of $0.39. The sample median
spread is $0.50 with the quartiles at ‒$0.09 and $1.12. As expected, these statistics indicate that closed‐end
fixed income funds generally trade at a discount relative to their NAV.
Table 2 Sample descriptive statistics: Fund NAV, price and spread
This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample of 214,936 closed-end fixed income fund days
between 2006 and 2012. NAV represents the fund managers’ estimated value of a share of the fund at the end
of the day. Price represents the end of day price of a share of the fund on the open market. Both of these are
collected from Bloomberg. Spread is calculated as NAV price.
N
Min
P25
Mean
Median
P75
Max
Std
NAV
214,936
1.23
8.41
13.16
12.71
16.69
74.85
7.54
Price
214,936
0.85
7.89
12.77
12.09
16.08
92.35
8.25
Spread
214,936
‒24.25
‒0.09
0.39
0.5
1.12
13.44
1.61
A large body of work examines closed‐end fund prices and NAVs and finds that these two time series are co‐
integrated.[ 11] To ensure the consistency of our sample with the prior literature, we examine the co‐integration
of NAV and price in our data. In unreported tests we find that NAV and price are co‐integrated, with stationary
error terms, for approximately 93% of the funds in our sample.[ 12] Having confirmed that NAV and price are co‐
integrated in our sample, we next move to our primary research question of whether or not a floating NAV
improves the transparency of risk

4. Analysis
Our data set includes daily closing market prices and daily NAVs for the closed‐end fixed income funds in our
sample. The daily NAV represents the closing value of the fund's portfolio, as reported by management. The
market closing price provides investors’ estimate of the closing value of the fund's portfolio. As mentioned
previously, closing prices are reported before NAV, due to the need for management to estimate NAV.
We first examine how often investor's valuation changes agree with those of the fund's managers. In Table 3, we
report how frequently the change in price has the same sign as the change in NAV. We find the 85.74% of the
concurrent changes have the same sign. In other words, for approximately seven of eight days NAV and price
move in the same direction. This suggests that seven of eight times investors had the necessary information to
determine the direction of the value change reported by management, and hints that investors may not find
NAV changes informative.
Table 3 Daily changes in NAV and price
This table consists of the full sample. Column 2 shows the number of fund days the sign of the change in price
from close to close matches the contemporaneous sign of the change in NAV from close to close. Column 3 gives
the percentage of the fund days with different or the same signs.
N
Percent
Different sign
30,650
14.26%

Same sign
Total

184,286
214,936

85.74%

However, because closing prices are recorded before a fund reports its closing NAV, examining concurrent
change does not allow investors to observe the change in NAV. Therefore, to examine how investors respond to
NAV changes we explore how daily NAV changes relate to the overnight price change (closing price at time t to
opening price at t + 1).
If NAV provides information to investors then we would expect that overnight price changes would follow the
NAV change. If investors do not find NAV changes informative then an efficient market would predict that the
overnight price change should be in the same direction as the previous day's NAV change 50% of the time. Table
4 provides the frequency at which an NAV change is followed by an overnight price change of the same sign. The
results show that the overnight change has the same sign as the preceding NAV change 43.62% of the time. This
is consistent with an efficient market, and investors learning little if anything from changes in the fund's NAV.
Table 4 Daily NAV changes and subsequent overnight price changes
This table consists of the full sample. Column 2 shows the number of fund days the sign of the change in
NAV from close to close matches the sign of the following overnight change in price. Column 3 gives the
percentage of the fund days with different or the same signs.
N
Percent
Different sign
121,098
56.38%
Same sign
93,676
43.62%
Total
214,774
However, the entire sample may not be the place to ask this question, as concurrent price and NAV changes are
in the same direction for about 86% of our sample. NAV is likely to be most valuable when concurrent NAV and
price move in opposite directions. In Table 5, we limit our sample to those instances when concurrent price
change and NAV change have different signs. The NAV change and the subsequent overnight price change have
the same sign 52.48% of the time. With a sample size of 30,650 a frequency of 52.48% is likely statistically
different from 50%, but the question is whether a floating NAV improves the transparency of risk for investors.
Having the same sign 52.48% of the time is unlikely to provide investors with any additional comfort about the
amount of risk in their investment.
Table 5 Overnight price changes following contemporaneous NAV and price change disagreements
This table consists of the subset of fund days when the contemporaneous change in price and change in NAV go
in opposite directions. Column 2 shows the number of fund days the sign of the change in NAV from close to
close matches the following overnight sign of the change in price from close to open. Column 3 gives the
percentage of the fund days with different or the same signs.
N
Percent
Different sign
14,565
47.52%
Same sign
16,085
52.48%
Total
30,650

4.1. Duration

Our results to this point suggest that a floating NAV provides investors little, if any, additional information about
the risk of their investment. This is likely because the assets in the fund's portfolio trade infrequently forcing the

use of estimated values in the NAV calculations. A general scarcity of trades in the fixed income securities
market is noted by Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman ([ 5] ), Warga ([ 15] , [ 16] ), and Warga and Welch
([ 17] ). However, it has been noted that trading frequency is inversely related to a bond's time to maturity (see
Barclay, Hendershott and Kotz, [ 4] ), which suggests that the maturity of the bonds in a fund's portfolio could
influence how informative investors find manager's NAV estimates. While we are unable to observe the fund's
portfolio maturity directly, Morningstar does provide portfolio duration. We use duration as a proxy for time to
maturity and examine whether portfolio duration, as a proxy for trading frequency, is related to the information
content of floating NAV.
We begin the duration‐based analysis by first separating out funds with durations of less than one year. We
separate out funds that invest in ultra‐short term investments as this represents the traditional boundary
between money market instruments and capital market instruments. Once we remove these ultra‐short funds,
we divide the remaining funds into terciles based on the duration of their portfolios, giving us four duration
subsamples.
Having created our four duration groups, we examine the frequency with which overnight price changes follow
the prior day's NAV changes, when the prior day's price and NAV moved in opposite directions. Table 6 presents
the results of this analysis. Panel A reports the results for those funds with a duration of less than one year. We
find that the NAV change is followed by an overnight price change of the same sign 52.52% of the time. Panel B
reports the results for the shortest duration tercile, and finds that when NAV and price move in opposite
directions, the overnight price change has the same sign as the NAV change only 50.10% of the time. Panel C,
the middle duration tercile, reports that the direction of the overnight price change is consistent with the prior
day's NAV change 53.05% of the time. Last Panel D, reports the result for the longest duration tercile, and finds
that the NAV change is followed by an overnight price change of the same sign 50.24% of the time. These results
suggest that regardless of the fund's duration investors do not find NAV changes informative. Additionally, the
relative consistency of our results across subsamples suggests that the duration, and therefore, the difference in
trading frequency among assets that trade infrequently do not impact how investors view NAV changes.
Table 6 Overnight price changes analysis for different duration portfolios
This table presents the results of our duration subsample analysis. We limit the sample to those days when
concurrent price and NAV changes moved in different directions. We then separate the sample into four
duration groups, and present the frequency with which the direction of the overnight price change is consistent
with the prior day’s NAV change. Panel A presents the results for those funds with durations of under a year.
Panel B presents the results for the low duration tercile. Panel C presents the middle duration tercile. Panel D
presents the longest duration tercile.
N
Percent
Panel A
Different sign
1,414
47.48%
Same sign
1,564
52.52%
Total
2,978
Panel B
Different sign
2,634
49.90%
Same sign
2,645
50.10%
Total
5,279
Panel C
Different sign
2,783
46.95%
Same sign
3,145
53.05%
Total
5,928

Panel D
Different sign
Same sign
Total

2,444
2,468
4,912

49.76%
50.24%

4.2. Regression analysis

Our focus on the coarse measure of the direction of NAV and price changes could obscure a more subtle relation
between NAV changes and price changes. To examine whether a more subtle relation exists we estimate the
following regression model:

where

and

𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥, 𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 − 1, 𝑖𝑖 + ɛ𝑖𝑖,

𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 − 1 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 1.

Estimating this model with ordinary least squares has potential econometric problems due to the discrete
nature of price changes and the continuous nature of information changes. To address the discrete nature of the
dependent variable, we use an interval regression model that uses a range as the dependent variable to predict
the value of the outcome variable. Using a range of half a cent below and above the change in price allows the
dependent variable to move in a continuous manner. For example, instead of forcing the dependent variable to
be $1.50, we allow it to be between $1.495 and $1.505. Thus, we control for the possibility of small pieces of
information in the independent variable (changes in NAV) leading to information value of less than $0.01 in
prices.
We estimate the regression model for every fund in our sample to determine the frequency that changes in NAV
are able to predict changes in price. We report the summary results from the regressions in Table 7. Table 7
reports that for the entire sample that β is positive and significant for 46% of the funds in our sample. While this
suggests that changes in NAV may be informative for investors in some funds, whether or not it is informative
for any single fund is no better than a coin flip.
Table 7 Interval censored regression analysis
This table shows the results of the interval censored regressions. Row 1 is the full sample of funds. Each column
represents the percentage of funds that have a negative significant, insignificant, or positive significant beta for
the regression Ln(Price)t,t = α + β(Ln(NAV )t−1,i+εi) . Because it is an interval censored regression, the
dependent variable is a range of a half-a-cent above and below the given change in price. Row 2 represents
funds with average effective durations of less than one year. Rows 3–5 show results of the regressions for all
funds with average effective durations of more than one year. These three groups are divided into terciles.
Tercile 1 funds have the lowest duration of the three groups. Tercile 2 funds are the middle group. Tercile 3
funds have the longest average effective durations.
Negative
Insignificant
Positive
Full sample
7%
47%
46%
Less than 1 year
0%
50%
50%
Tercile 1
4%
46%
50%
Tercile 2
11%
50%
39%
Tercile 3
8%
52%
40%

We again break our sample into the four duration subsamples to examine the impact that duration may have on the
informativeness of NAV changes. Across all four subgroups β is insignificant for between 46% and 52% of funds. This finding
suggests that duration differences do not inform NAV changes, and suggests that NAV provides little, if any, information to
investors.

4.3. NAV variance

Our analysis to this point has focused on whether a floating NAV provides immediate information to investors.
Another way to examine the question of transparency of risk in funds is whether the volatility of floating NAV is
a predictor of future volatility.
In this section, we explore the ability of this month's fund risk to predict next month risk. Specifically, we
calculate each fund's monthly NAV variance. We then rank each fund each month into terciles based on its
calculated variance. We test whether knowing which risk tercile the fund was in last month helps an investor
predict which risk tercile the fund will be in this month.
Table 8, Panel A, reports the frequency with which a fund in the lowest NAV variance tercile is in the lowest NAV
variance tercile the next month. We find that a fund will continue in the low risk tercile only 7.16% of the time.
Table 8, Panel B, shows a similar result for the high risk tercile. This suggests that observing the variance on a
fund's NAV provides little information regarding the variance of its NAV next month.
Table 8 NAV variance analysis
This table presents the results of our analysis regarding the consistency of a fund’s NAV risk. Panel A presents
the frequency with which a fund in the low NAV variance tercile in month t – 1 will be in the low NAV variance
tercile in month t. Panel B presents the frequency that a fund in the high NAV variance tercile in month t – 1, is
in the high NAV variance tercile in month t.
N
Percent
Panel A
Different tercile
3,397
92.84%
Same tercile
262
7.16%
Total
3,659
Panel B
Different tercile
3,334
92.46%
Same tercile
272
7.54%
Total
3,606
Table 9 reports the ability of last month's NAV variance to predict this month's price variance. Similar to the
results presented in Table 9 , we find that funds in the low risk NAV tercile are in the low risk price tercile in the
following month only 7.35% of the time. The frequency drops to 7.15% for the high risk terciles. These results
suggest that a floating NAV is likely to provide little, if any, transparency with respect to risk.
Table 9 NAV and price variance analysis
This table presents the results of our analysis regarding the ability of a funds NAV variance to predict the
variance of the fund’s price in the following month. Panel A presents the frequency with which a fund in the low
NAV variance tercile in month t – 1 will be in the low price variance tercile in month t. Panel B presents the
frequency that a fund in the high NAV variance tercile in month t – 1, is in the high price variance tercile in
month t.
Panel A
Different tercile

N

Percent

3,390

92.65%

Same tercile
Total
Panel B
Different tercile
Same tercile
Total

269
3,659

7.35%

3,348
258
3,606

92.85%
7.15%

5. Conclusion

This paper examines whether a floating NAV improves the transparency of risk when the securities in the fund's
portfolio trade infrequently. We examine this question using closed‐end fixed income fund data, because these
data are uniquely qualified to address this question. Specifically, closed‐end fixed income funds invest in
securities that trade infrequently; the funds are required to report their NAV daily, and investors trade closed‐
end fixed income share in a market.
We fail to find evidence that a floating NAV helps investors better understand how the portfolio's value changes,
or predicts the relative risk of the fund. This suggests that requiring MMFs to switch to a floating NAV is likely to
provide limited transparency on risk. If the argument is that simply seeing NAV fluctuate will make investors
aware of risk, then limiting its implementation to institutional funds would seem redundant. Anyone able to
invest $1 million in a money market account is likely to be financially sophisticated, which suggests they already
understand that MMFs are risky.
New regulations should be evaluated in a cost/benefit analysis. Our results suggest that MMF investors will not
derive any additional information about the risk or value of their MMF investment from floating the NAV. With
little benefit from floating the NAV the best we can hope is that the required change to a floating NAV for prime
institutional MMFs is benign. Alternatively, the change could be destructive. An April 6, 2015, Wall Street Journal
article discusses BlackRock reducing their MMF offerings from around 50 funds to around 30 funds and
converting some prime MMFs to government MMFs, which are not required to use a floating NAV, in response
to the change in regulations (Burne, [ 8] ). Also, Fidelity is converting three prime MMFs to government MMFs,
while JP Morgan Asset Management is simply changing its prime fund to a floating NAV, and Federated is
shortening the maturity of some of its prime MMFs. Given our results, movement away from prime MMFs raises
the question of whether this regulatory change is destructive. The possibility of being destructive is particularly
important because the multitrillion dollar prime MMF sector is an important source of short‐term funding for
both financial and nonfinancial firms (see Chernenko and Sunderam, [ 11] ).

Footnotes

1 Reserve Primary was forced to write down the value of the Lehman's commercial paper it held.
2 See Akay, Griffiths and Winters (2014b) for an analysis of the demise of Reserve Primary fund, which shows the
fragility of the MMF structure. See Akay, Griffiths, Kotomin and Winters (1) for a discussion of the
Federal Reserve's AMLF program to address the issues for MMFs holding Asset‐Backed CP.
3 See Akay, Griffiths and Winters (2014a) for a discussion of the changes to rule 2a‐7 in January of 2010.
4 The goal of these changes is to “improve their ability to manage and mitigate potential contagion from such
redemptions, and increase the transparency of their risks, while preserving, as much as possible, their
benefits.” From page 1 of SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 17 CFR Parts 230, 239, 270, 274
and 279, Release No. 33‐9616, IA‐3879; IC‐31166; FR‐84; File No. S7‐03‐13,RIN 3235‐AK61, Money
Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF.
5 Note that the summary of the final rule uses the term “institutional nongovernment” MMFs while the detailed
discussion of the floating NAV uses the term “institutional prime” MMFs. The term “prime” is the
industry description for the funds that the SEC is focused on for floating NAV. The SEC uses the term

“nongovernment” because they include in this designation some other types of MMFs that are not major
segments of the market.
6 The switch to a floating NAV is also supposed to mitigate the first mover advantage. This is accomplished
mechanically as investors now enter and leave the fund at the prevailing market prices.
7 Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (5) examine institutional trading of corporate bonds and report less
than 50 trades per bond issue over a six‐month period.
8 This quote is from Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (5).
9 Also, Greene and Hodge (13) only find evidence of these trading opportunities in open‐end international funds.
10 All of the categories of assets reported in Table trade infrequently.
11 For example, Chang, Eun and Kolodny (10) and Gasbarro, Johnson and Zumwalt (12).
12 Gasbarro, Johnson and Zumwalt (12) find co‐integration of price and NAV on 95% of the closed‐end fixed
income funds they examine. They note that most funds are co‐integrated but that there are exceptions.
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